\u3cem\u3eMilkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.\u3c/em\u3e: Wrestling With Opinion by Trespalacios, Mario J.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review
7-1-1991
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: Wrestling With
Opinion
Mario J. Trespalacios
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
Entertainment & Sports Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mario J. Trespalacios, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: Wrestling With Opinion, 8 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 195 (1991)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol8/iss1/8
NOTE
MILKOVICH v. LORAIN JOURNAL CO.:
WRESTLING WITH OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 195
II. M ILKOVICH V. LORAIN JOURNAL Co ........................................ 196
A. The Underlying Facts ....................... . . . ....... 196
B . P rocedure B elow .................................................. 198
III. D ISCU SSIO N ........................... ................................ 202
A . T he M ajority ................................. ................... 202
B . T h e D issent ...................................... .............. . 206
C . D iscussion ........................................................ 208
IV . C ONCLUSIO N ........................................................... 211
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the common law has provided a means of re-
dress for injuries to a person's name and reputation.' This protec-
tion is predicated on the belief that a person's repute is a valued
possession, and any damage to it should be compensated.2 A judg-
ment against the defamant is considered adequate vindication for
this wrong.3
In the United States, however, because of the concomitant in-
terest in free speech and liberty of expression,4 the ability to re-
cover for damages to one's reputation, or for perceived slights to
one's name, is tempered by concerns that the threat of a cause of
action for defamation stifles the free exchange of ideas.5 Once the
courts began balancing these ideals and protections, they em-
1. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2702 (1990)(citing L. ELDREDGE,
LAW OF DEFAMATION 5 (1978)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. The freedom of expression clause of the first amendment provides as follows: "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
5. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Constitution limits appli-
cability of state defamation laws); cf. infra note 36.
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barked on a constant struggle to fashion a rule or standard that
would balance these interests.
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,6 the United States Su-
preme Court, for the first time, directly addressed the contours of
the constitutional protection to be afforded statements that solely
contain opinion.7 The Court examined whether "an additional sep-
arate constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is required to ensure the
freedom of expression guaranteed by the [f]irst [a]mendment."8
Specifically, at what point does the opinion of a reporter for a pub-
lication become actionable as defamatory?
This Note examines the limitations and ramifications of the
Supreme Court's decision, initially focusing on the facts and proce-
dural posture of Milkovich. Next, it analyzes the Court's reasoning
and conclusion, as contrasted with the reasoning in Justice Bren-
nan's dissent. Finally, this Note addresses the impact of this
decision.
II. MILKOVICH V. LORAIN JOURNAL Co.
A. The Underlying Facts
J. Theodore Diadiun wrote an article in the Willoughby News-
Herald,9 an Ohio newspaper, which contained allegations that a lo-
cal high school wrestling coach, Michael Milkovich, and the area's
public school superintendent, H. Don Scott, perjured themselves in
a court proceeding. 10 After nearly fifteen years of litigation," and
three petitions for certiorari, 2 the United States Supreme Court
granted review.
In 1974, the Maple Heights High School wrestling team, under
Milkovich's tutelage, met to compete with the Mentor High School
team. 3 During the match an altercation erupted involving players
and fans; some Mentor High School students sustained injuries.'
The Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA) conducted a
hearing on the incident. 15 Milkovich and Scott testified at the
6. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
7. Id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2707.
9. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 145, 416 N.E.2d 662, 664
(1979).
10. 110 S. Ct. at 2697-98.
11. Id. at 2698.
12. Id. at 2698 n.1; see also infra notes 39 & 49.
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hearing.1 6 OHSAA placed the Maple Heights team on one year's
probation and declared the team ineligible for the 1975 state tour-
nament.1 7 Further, OHSAA censored Milkovich for his actions dur-
ing the incident.1 8
In response to OHSAA's determination, several parents along
with members of the wrestling team sought a court order re-
straining enforcement of OHSAA's determination, alleging that
during OHSAA's proceedings the parents and wrestlers were not
afforded their due process rights.1 9 Milkovich and Scott also testi-
fied in that judicial proceeding.20 The court enjoined OHSAA's
probation and ineligibility orders on due process grounds."1
The court's decision prompted Diadiun to write the column in
the Willoughby News-Herald, Mentor High School's hometown
newspaper.22 The column, a signed editorial, 3 proclaimed in its
headline that "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,' ,;24 the head-
line on the continuing page stated that "Diadiun says Maple told a
lie."'2 5 Although the article correctly reported that the court
granted the injunction on due process grounds, it implied that
Milkovich failed in his primary function as an educator,"8 asserting
that the lesson the students learned from the incident was that
"[ilf you get in a jam, lie your way out. 2 7 In addition, the article
avowed that any observer "knows in his heart that Milkovich and
Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to




19. Id.; Barrett v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, No. 74 Civ. 09-3390 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pleas Jan. 7, 1975) (unreported), cited in Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d
292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984).
20. 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2711 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d at
292, 473 N.E.2d at 1192.
23. 110 S. Ct. at 2713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2698.
25. Id.
26. ld. at 2698-99 n.2.
27. Id. at 2698.
28. Id. Milkovich alleged that the following passages of the column contained defama-
tory material:
[A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple
Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor wrestling
meet of last Feb. 8.
A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well they learned
early.
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
1991]
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were discrepancies between Milkovich's and Scott's testimony at
the OHSAA proceeding and the hearing before the trial court.2 9
Diadiun's article sparked this prolonged litigation. 30
B. Procedure Below
Milkovich and Scott"1 instituted separate defamation actions
against Diadiun, the newspaper, and its owner, the Lorain Journal
Company. Milkovich and Scott contended that the article defamed
them and accused them of perjury, an indictable offense under
Ohio law.32 Milkovich further claimed that he had been damaged
in his profession as coach and teacher. 3 In short, Milkovich as-
serted that the statements amounted to libel per se.3 4
At trial, the court granted defendants' motions for a directed
verdict, reasoning that Milkovich failed to make a showing that the
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough,
you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what
really happened.
The teachers responsible were mainly Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich,
and former superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or
impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hear-
ing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high
school administrators and coaches?
I think not.
110 S. Ct. at 2698; Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 21, 545 N.E.2d 1320,
1321-22 (1989).
29. 110 S. Ct. at 2699 n.2.
30. Id. at 2699.
31. Scott is not a party to this proceeding. In Scott's separate defamation action
against Diadiun and Lorain Journal Company, the trial court entered a summary judgment
in defendants' favor. Id. at 2700. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment. Scott v. News-
Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 244, 496 N.E.2d 699, 701 (1986). On appeal, the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the column was "constitutionally protected opinion." Id. at
254, 496 N.E.2d at 709.
Because the Scott court overruled its earlier decision in Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15
Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984), this decision later prompted an Ohio Court of
Appeals to affirm a summary judgment against Milkovich, favoring Diadiun and Lorain, 110
S. Ct. at 2701 (citing Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 23, 545 N.E.2d 1320,
1324 (1989)), leading to the United States Supreme Court granting certiorari review. 110 S.
Ct. at 2701.
32. 110 S. Ct. at 2699.
33. Id. at 2699-2700.
34. Id. at 2700. "A publication is libelous per se when the words are of such a charac-
ter that an action may be brought upon them without the necessity of showing any special
damage, the imputation being such that the law will presume that one so slandered must
have suffered damage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 825 (5th ed. 1979).
[Vol. 8:195
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article was published with "actual malice"3 as required by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 6 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed
the order and remanded the case, holding that there had been suf-
ficient showing of actual malice to submit the question to the
jury.3 7 Defendants' appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was dis-
missed,"8 and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.3 9
On remand, the trial court granted a motion for summary
35. Id. The trial court, in granting a directed verdict for defendants, found that the
evidence failed "to establish by clear and convincing proof that the article which was the
subject of this action was published with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth .... " Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 144, 416 N.E.2d
662, 664 (1979).
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In granting the directed verdict, the trial court determined
that under Sullivan, Milkovich, a public figure, had not shown that the article was pub-
lished with actual malice. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio. App. 2d at 149, 416
N.E.2d at 666.
In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court examined an action in common law libel
stemming from criticisms of a public official in his official capacity. 376 U.S. at 256, 268.
This was the first case in which the Court considered constitutional limitations on libel
actions. Id. at 269.
Sullivan examined the origins and purpose of the first amendment, namely, to secure a
free exchange of ideas for "the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people." The Sullivan Court held that the first amendment requires a rule prohibiting re-
covery in a defamation action by a public official unless he can prove actual malice. Id. at
269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
The Court defined actual malice as knowledge of the falsity of the statements or reck-
less disregard for the truth. Id. at 280-81. This holding raised the threshold for recovery for
defamation by a public official.
37. 110 S. Ct. at 2700 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143,
416 N.E.2d 662 (1979)). The Ohio Court of Appeals relied on facts, adduced at trial, that
demonstrated that Diadiun had not attended the hearing about which he was writing.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d at 145, 416 N.E.2d at 665. Further, Mr.
Diadiun, during cross-examination revealed the following:
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Diadiun, that you never read any transcript of what oc-
curred at that trial until after you published the article?
A. Yes.
Q. Didn't you think it was necessary for you to read that decision [of Judge Paul
Martin of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County] before you published
such an article?
A. Like I said, I knew the background of the whole case. I knew what Dr. Meyer
told me went on at that trial. I didn't feel that I needed [to]-
Q. The fact of the matter is, you never took the trouble to find that decision and
read it, did you?
A. I didn't find the decision, no.
Q. You didn't find it necessary to read it?
A. No.
Milkovich, 65 Ohio App. 2d at 145-46, 416 N.E.2d at 665. The court of appeals stated that
based on these facts, a jury could conclude that the article was published with "actual mal-
ice." See supra note 36 and infra notes 65 & 66.
38. The court found the case did not present a substantial constitutional question. 110
S. Ct. at 2700.
39. Id. at 2700; 449 U.S. 966 (1980).
1991]
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judgment in defendants' favor.4 0 The court rested its decision on
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,1 finding that the column expressed
an opinion and was not actionable as libel under constitutional law
principles.4 2 Milkovich, as a public figure, failed to make a prima
facie showing of actual malice.48
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the decision." On appeal,
however, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded.45 The
court determined that Milkovich was neither a public figure nor a
public official.4 ' Further, the court found that the statements in
40. 110 S. Ct. at 2700.
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz holding symbolizes two significant changes in the
area of libel law: (1) persons who seek public attention are public figures and must prove
actual malice under the New York Times v. Sullivan holding in order to recover damages in
an action for libel, 418 U.S. at 346; and (2) the state's interest in allowing redress for private
individuals is so great that the state may define the appropriate standard of liability, so long
as it requires at least some showing of fault. Id.
The Milkovich trial court -determined that the coach was a public figure, reasoning
under Gertz that he had been thrust into a public controversy. Milkovich v. News-Herald,
15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 294, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1192 (1984); see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. The court
found that as a public figure, Milkovich had not made a prima facie case of actual malice.
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700; Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d
1191 (1984). On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. at 294-299, 473
N.E.2d at 1193-96. See infra notes 65 & 66.




46. Id. (citing Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984)).
In the preliminary stages of the proceedings, the trial court found that Milkovich was a
public figure. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 'Ohio St. 3d at 293, 473 N.E.2d at 1192.
Milkovich did not appeal this finding until after the court of appeals reversed a directed
verdict in defendants' favor and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at 293, 473 N.E.2d
at 1193. On remand, the trial court entered summary judgment for defendants based on its
conclusion that Diadiun's article was protected as an expression of opinion. Id. The court of
appeals affirmed the summary judgment. Id. at 293, 473 N.E.2d at 1193. The Ohio Supreme
Court reversed. Id. at 296, 473 N.E.2d at 1195. Following the reasoning in Gertz, the Ohio
Supreme Court determined that even though Milkovich was recognized and admired in his
community, his position did not put him at the forefront of public controversies and he
could not exert influence in the resolution of these controversies. Id. at 297, 473 N.E.2d at
1195.
However, in its subsequent opinion, Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496
N.E.2d 699 (1986), relying on Justice Brennan's reasoning in Lorain Journal Co. v.
Milkovich, 106 S. Ct. 322 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Ohio Supreme Court over-
ruled Milkovich v. News-Herald, "in its restrictive view of public officials." Scott, 25 Ohio
St. 3d at 248, 496 N.E.2d at 704. Based on the Scott decision, the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in defendants' favor. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 21-22,
545 N.E.2d 1320, 1322 (1989). The court of appeals, reviewing the second summary judg-
ment, did not reach the issue whether Scott rendered Milkovich a public figure, relying
solely on the determination in Scott that the article contained constitutionally protected
opinion. Id. at 23-24, 545 N.E.2d at 1324. Because the court of appeals determined that
Scott was binding and Milkovich no longer applied, the court never directly addressed the
[Vol. 8:195
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the article were "factual assertions as a matter of law, and [were]
not constitutionally protected as the opinions of the writer.. . ."-
The court concluded that Diadiun's statements branded Milkovich
a perjurer.48 The United States Supreme Court again denied cer-
tiorari review. 9
On remand, the trial court granted a second motion for sum-
mary judgment in defendants' favor.50 The Ohio Court of Ap-
peals5 affirmed this order,5 2 relying on an Ohio Supreme Court de-
cision that distinguished between statements of fact and opinion,3
and held that opinion statements are absolutely privileged under
the first amendment." Because this determination created a con-
stitutional protection for opinion statements under the law of defa-
issue of Milkovich's status as a public or private figure plaintiff as affected by Scott.
The United States Supreme Court concludes in Milkovich that Scott's references to
Milkovich are dicta. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2695, 2701-02 n.5. Further, because the Ohio
Court of Appeals did not reach the issue whether Milkovich was a public figure, the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich is still the law to be applied to Milkovich. The Su-
preme Court did not address this issue, leaving its determination to the Ohio Supreme
Court. Id.
47. 110 S. Ct. at 2700. The court declined to establish a per se rule protecting opinion
statements. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 298, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196
(1984).
48. 110 S. Ct. at 2700. The court reasoned that the statements were factual assertions
because nothing in the article alerted the reader that he was reading the author's opinion.
Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 299, 473 N.E.2d at 1197 ("The plain import of
the author's assertions is that Milkovich, inter alia, committed the crime of perjury in a
court of law.").
49. 110 S. Ct. at 2700.
50. 110 S. Ct. at 2701. Defendants claimed that the decision in Scott v. News-Herald,
25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986), established that the article in question was opin-
ion, privileged under the first amendment. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20,
22, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1323 (1989).
51. While Milkovich was prosecuting his case, Scott was also appealing adverse rul-
ings. Two years after it decided Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d
1191 (1984), the Ohio Supreme Court reversed itself, and upheld a summary judgment
against Scott, holding that Diadiun's article was constitutionally protected opinion." 110 S.
Ct. at 2700; Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709. The Milkovich
court of appeals was then bound by this decision. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
53. Id. at 2700; see supra note 51 and accompanying text. The court adopted the to-
tality of the circumstances test, elaborated in Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The test considers the following four factors in
determining whether a statement is fact or opinion: (1) the specific language used; (2)
whether the statement is verifiable; (3) the general context of the statement; and (4) the
broader context in which the statement appeared. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243,
250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986).
54. In Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986), the Ohio
Supreme Court determined that the article written by Diadiun was opinion, id. at 254, 496
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The United States Supreme Court narrowly framed the issues
under review as follows: 1) whether there is a constitutional privi-
lege for opinion statements; and 2) whether a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the statements in the Diadiun column implied
an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a judi-
cial proceeding." The Court determined that a reasonable
factfinder could reach this conclusion and reversed the summary
judgment in defendants' favor.57 The Court declined to hold that
there is a constitutional privilege for opinion statements. The
Court also held that Diadiun's statements were "sufficiently fac-
tual to be susceptible of being proved true or false."" Writing for
the majority, 0 Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is carefully crafted to
avoid overinclusive determinations or resolutions.
Justice Rehnquist began by tracing the common law history of
defamation actions, and the development of constitutional inroads
into that action. This analysis exposed the effect these develop-
ments have on defendants' request for a first amendment privilege
for opinion statements under defamation law.6 1 The majority re-
futed the Ohio Supreme Court's allusion that the article could be
merely figurative or hyperbolic,62 and focused on the serious nature
of the perjury charge. es
The Court's decision is well reasoned in view of defendants'
request that the Court create a constitutional privilege for defama-
55. 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
56. Id. at 2707.
57. Id. at 2707-08.
58. Id. at 2707.
59. Id.
60. All the Justices, except Brennan and Marshal, joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
61. 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
62. In its Scott opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court states that defendant's article "ap-
peared on the sports page-a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole."
Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
63. Justice Rehnquist concluded: "This is not the sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic
language which would negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining peti-
tioner committed the crime of perjury. Nor does the general tenor of the article negate this
impression." 110 S. Ct. at 2707. See also Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54,
64 (2d Cir. 1980) (A person should not be able to "escape liability for accusations of crime
simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I think.' ").
[Vol. 8:195
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tory statements which are categorized as opinion, not fact. The
Constitution affords protection against defamation actions brought
by public officials when the alleged defamatory or false statements
relate to the person's official conduct, or conduct displayed in the
exercise of official duties. 4 Ever mindful of the need to balance the
interest of free flowing information with the individual's interest in
guarding against intentional slurs of his or her name and character,
the Court still allows public officials to successfully maintain ac-
tions for defamation, provided the public official plaintiff proves
that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with "actual
malice." 65
With this balance in mind, the Court defined actual malice as
the knowledge that the alleged statement is false, or the reckless
disregard for the truth. 6 This standard allows a public official to
recover for damages caused by statements that are truly defama-
tory-those statements which falsely impugn his or her honor or
character-while avoiding any chilling effect on the exchange of
ideas which merely attempt to criticize some aspect of the official's
official conduct within the realm of truth.6 7
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts6 s extends this standard to pub-
64. Id. at 2703 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
65. Id. (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80). See also supra note 41.
66. Id.
67. Under the first amendment there can be no recovery for statements that are
merely critical of official conduct absent a showing of actual malice. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
279-80. This avoids hampering the free exchange of ideas in Justice Holmes' "marketplace
of ideas." 110 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
68. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Curtis Publishing is a consolidated case. Case No. 37, the
case's namesake, arose from an article in which Butts, the Athletic Director for the Univer-
sity of Georgia, was accused of fixing a football game. The article was allegedly based on a
phone conversation overheard by an informant during which Butts allegedly disclosed team
secrets to an opponent.
Curtis Publishing did not rely on any constitutional arguments; rather, it asserted only
truth as a defense. The jury returned a verdict in Butts' favor. On appeal to the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, the verdict and judgment were affirmed. The court reasoned that any
constitutional defenses had been waived for failure to assert them. The trial was completed
before the United States Supreme Court rendered its Sullivan decision.
In Case No. 150, Associated Press v. Walker, a former army officer who was accused in
a news report of inciting an angry mob of protestors against federal marshals instituted a
lawsuit for libel. Walker, who had been outspoken about physical federal intervention, was
at a demonstration opposing the enrollment of a black man in the University of Mississippi.
The mob began attacking the federal marshals who were present.
At trial, the Associated Press raised both truth and constitutional protections as de-
fenses. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Walker. The trial court
noted that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of malice under Sullivan and
struck the punitive damages award. The jury's verdict was affirmed on appeal.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the verdict in Butts' favor, finding that
1991]
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lic figures. The reasoning behind the extension is that persons in
the limelight of public attention expose themselves to public scru-
tiny. "[T]heir fame[] shape[s] events in areas of concern to society
at large." 9 Allowing commentary on their acts and behavior pro-
motes the exchange of information for the good of the public. 0
The Supreme Court did not extend this elevated standard to
private figure plaintiffs who bring defamation actions, even though
the alleged defamatory statements may be of public concern. 71 The
Court reasoned that, unlike public officials and public figures, the
average private citizen does not have access to media or publicity
sources to offset the defamatory statement or material.72 A defa-
mation action provides the most likely means by which private cit-
izens may redress any harm done to their reputation. Overly re-
stricting that action effectively bars the private plaintiff from
redress.73
The Court nevertheless imposes some restrictions on all defa-
mation actions in order to safeguard constitutional protections.
The first restriction precludes the states from imposing liability
unless a plaintiff can show some fault on the part of the defend-
ant. 7 If a plaintiff is a public figure or official, this showing of fault
requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
acted with malice.7 5 The private individual need only demonstrate
although Butts was a public figure, he could recover for defamatory falsehoods based "on a
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Curtis
Publishing, 388 U.S. at 155. The Supreme Court reversed the Walker verdict. Walker's po-
litical prominence and outspoken behavior on the issue rendered him a public figure.
Walker succeeded in demonstrating that the Associated Press' techniques were shoddy or
unprofessional.
69. 110 S. Ct. at 2703 (quoting Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 164). The Court found
that public figures, unlike private individuals, have exposed themselves to possible com-
ments about their persons: "[More importantly,] public officials and public figures have vol-
untarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concern-
ing them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual." 110 S. Ct. at
2704 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 344-45).
70. Id. at 2706.
71. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
72. "Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy." Id. at 2704 (citing
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45).
73. 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
74. Id. at 2706 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48). This measure is meant to allow the
states the ability to provide redress for its citizens' wrongs, while shielding defendants from
strict liability for defamation. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
75. 110 S. Ct. 2703-04. For a discussion of the Sullivan and Curtis Publishing deci-
sions, see supra notes 67 & 68.
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some degree of fault.71 The second restriction precludes the recov-
ery of presumed or punitive damages unless the plaintiff can prove
actual malice as defined in Sullivan."
Against this historical background, Justice Rehnquist ad-
dressed the request to create a "[f]irst [a]mendment-based protec-
tion for defamatory statements which are categorized as 'opinion'
as opposed to 'fact.' ",78 In essence, defendants argued that because
the statements in the article solely expressed Diadiun's opinion,
and because Diadiun had no factual basis for the assertion that
Milkovich perjured himself, the statements were privileged expres-
sion. The author, therefore, could not be penalized for merely ex-
pressing an opinion.
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that it would cre-
ate an "artificial dichotomy" in the analysis of allegedly defama-
tory statements on the basis of their classification as either opinion
or fact.7 9 The Court first reasoned that an analysis of any state-
ment on a matter of public concern, alleged to be defamatory,
must begin with an inquiry into whether the statement is provable
as false, not whether it is opinion. 0 The dissent, authored by Jus-
tice Brennan, agreed with this portion of the opinion."1
Justice Rehnquist articulated the second inquiry concerning
an allegedly defamatory statement as follows: Can the statement
"reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts"? 2 The
purpose for this second inquiry is to remove from the realm of def-
amation any statements that may be viewed as strictly colorful,
rhetorical or hyperbolic.88 These statements, greatly valued in dis-
course and debate, add significantly to free exchange in the "mar-
ketplace of ideas. '84 To submit these statements to the penalties of
defamation may lead to undesired repercussions. It may give rise
76. Id. at 2704.
77. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. This measure insures that the defamation actions will not
have a chilling effect on the media.
78. 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
79. Id. at 2706. The Ohio Supreme Court, after determining that opinion evidence was
privileged, stated that the first inquiry in a defamation action should be whether the state-
ments are fact or opinion. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 249-50, 496 N.E.2d 699,
705-06 (1986).
80. 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
81. Id. at 2708-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed that "only defamatory
statements that are capable of being proved false are subject to liability under state libel
law." Id.
82. Id. at 2705 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
83. Id.
84. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The Court recognized that rhetoric and
hyperbole did have a place in the realm of intellectual exchange. 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
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to defamation actions based on statements of exaggeration or ab-
surdity, statements that are not truly meant to be representative
of, referring to, or directed at, anyone. This might have a "chilling
effect" on public dissemination of information; constitutional defa-
mation law is designed to avoid this result.85 Under the constitu-
tional defamation analysis, statements of exaggeration or imagina-
tion do not defame because they are recognized as imaginative or
exaggerated by the recipient of the communication."'
The Milkovich majority determined that the allegations of
perjury raised in Diadiun's article do not fall within the protection
provision for "statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted
as stating actual facts' ,,;87 rather, they are statements susceptible
of being proved true or false. A comparison of the testimonies at
the OHSAA proceeding and before the trial court could verify the
perjury charge."
The Court considered the impact and style of Diadiun's article
in its analysis.9 0 The Court also adopted the analysis of the Ohio
Supreme Court, which determined that the impact of the allega-
tion in the column could be no less than to assert that Milkovich
lied at the hearing after having sworn to tell the truth."' The Court
then weighed the factuality of the statements and inquired into
the circumstances surrounding them. Based on this analysis, the
Court concluded that Diadiun's statements were defamatory and
that Milkovich had a cause of action.2
B. The Dissent
The dissent disagreed with the conclusion that Diadiun's
statements were actionable as defamatory.93 The dissent would
hold that the statements cannot reasonably be interpreted as stat-
ing or implying defamatory facts about Milkovich 9 4 The dissent
relied on the assertion that Diadiun was not present in court dur-
ing the hearing," reasoning that any reader would realize that
Diadiun's absence renders his statements mere conjecture or hy-
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
86. 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
87. Id. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).




92. Id. at 2708.
93. 110 S. Ct. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2711.
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perbole. The speculative nature of Diadiun's article was also evi-
denced by the words he used to describe the events on which he
commented."
The dissent focused on the format of the column, as a signed
editorial, and argued that "[i]t is plain from the column that
Diadiun did not attend the court hearing. '9 7 Yet, nowhere in the
article did the author mention his absence from the hearing. In
fact, Diadiun's allusions to his presence at the OHSAA hearing and
the wrestling meet could lead the reader to conclude the oppo-
site-that Diadiun attended the hearing. A person who closely fol-
lows the developments of a story and who appears to be well-in-
formed of the events is qualified to make a factual assertion about
the latest events. The reasonable reader-the standard the dissent
embraced-could certainly reach this conclusion. 8
Because of the column's context and the writer's bias, the per-
ception that it was "plain" from the column that Diadiun was not
at the hearing could cause the reader to surmise that "Diadiun was
focused on the court's reversal of the OHSAA decision and was
angrily supposing what must have led to it."9' Therefore, because
the reader could recognize this as conjecture and not as a factual
statement, there was no actionability. 100 According to the dissent,
any defamatory inference is further weakened by the author's use
of signal words such as "seemed," "probably," and "apparently." 10 1
These words alert the reader that the author is conjecturing. 102
Justice Brennan rejected the majority's conclusion that the ar-
ticle called Milkovich a perjurer. Although the dissent was not in
favor of creating a separate opinion privilege, it would not impose
liability on Diadiun for his uninformed opinion. Justice Brennan
cited Diadiun's ignorance of legal principles'"3 and stated that
"[i]gnorance, without more, has never served to defeat freedom of
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. A plaintiff must prove false what a reasonable reader understands the author to
have said. 110 S. Ct. at 2708.
99. Id. at 2712.
100. Id. at 2712 n.7. In Scott, however, the Ohio Supreme Court observed that the
impact of the article was that Scott had lied under oath. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.
3d at 251, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
101. 110 S. Ct. at 2711-12.
102. Id. at 2712.
103. The dissenting opinion explained that Diadiun must not have realized that an
injunction granted on due process grounds need not reach the veracity of the witnesses'
testimony. 110 S. Ct. at 2714.
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speech."10' In weighing the countervailing interests of reputation
and freedom of speech, the dissent favored free speech "as long as
it is clear to the reader that he is being offered conjecture.
1 05
In support of its position, the dissent delineated other specula-
tive comments which have been articulated on matters of public
interest:
Did NASA officials ignore sound warnings that the Challenger
Space Shuttle would explode? Did Cuban-American leaders ar-
range for John Fitzgerald Kennedy's assassination? Was Kurt
Waldheim a Nazi officer? Such questions are matters of public
concern long before all the facts are unearthed, if they ever are.
Conjecture is a means of fueling a national discourse on such
questions and stimulating public pressure for answers from
those who know more. 06
While the dissent's concerns are well founded, they are not sup-
ported by the facts of this case. The dissent's examples addressed
national issues; the case at hand deals with a local incident.' Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, however, debate on issues of local con-
cern can be as important to local citizens as debate on issues of
national appeal. Yet the nature of the incident Diadiun reported
did not rise to this magnitude, even at a local level. In addition,
Brennan's examples are political or historical in nature. Diadiun's
opinion does not fall into either category. The dissent used the au-
thor's bias and anger at the situation to bulwark its contention
that the reader would have understood the author was engaging in
conjecture. None of these examples, however, goes any further
than to raise suspicion about the group or person. Diadiun's article
did not question whether Milkovich lied at the court proceeding.
Rather than phrase its headlines along the lines of the dissent's
example, "Did Maple beat the law with a lie," the article stated
affirmatively that a lie had been told. As the majority noted, there
were no words of mitigation anywhere in Diadiun's column suffi-
cient to align it with the example the dissent offered.
C. Discussion
The dissent's reliance on the article's context and appearance




107. The Ohio Supreme Court determined that Milkovich was not a public figure. See
supra note 46. The Court did not address this issue.
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cient to claim that the article is not defamatory because it reflects
the author's bias and anger. Bias and anger, when added to
Diadiun's ignorance, amount to more than ignorance. Bias and an-
ger motivated Diadiun to write the article without having
researched the specifics of what had transpired at the hearing.108
This does not simply reflect an ignorance of what the law entails;
rather, it implies a failure to investigate properly, or to follow ac-
cepted standards of professionalism. 10 9 Justice Brennan stated that
Diadiun may be naive and may appear "foolish to lawyers," but he
was not liable for defamation. 10 This assertion is not supported by
the facts in this case, however, because the author knew that the
court granted the injunction on due process grounds.
There must be some responsibility to understand the facts
before fueling the debate. Diadiun could have informed himself by
questioning an attorney regarding the grounds for the injunction,
or by checking the court record, which is available to the public. If
the author of an editorial is naive about the concept of due pro-
cess, should not the same be expected of its readers? Surely such
erroneous debate does not contribute greatly to the "market place"
or "free flow of ideas."'
The dissent is understandably concerned with the chilling ef-
fect the application of the majority's rule will have on opinion.
However, the dissent's reasoning eliminates the majority's two-fold
inquiry. The majority's reasoning may be understood as follows.
The assertion "[i]n my opinion John Jones lied," must be analyzed
using two inquiries: (1) is the factual underpinning of the asser-
tion-the fact upon which the assertion is based-true?; and (2) is
the speaker's intention to defame John Jones?
1 12
The second inquiry addresses actual malice 1 and addresses
the intent of the speaker. If the requisite element of intent is es-
tablished, the private figure plaintiff may recover punitive dam-
ages." ' The majority's first inquiry deals with the ability of a
plaintiff to state a cause of action-a plaintiff's ability to prove the
statement's factual assertions as false.115
108. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
110. 110 S. Ct. at 2714 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. 110 S. Ct. at 2706 n.7.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 71.
115. The majority's inquiry into the factual underpinnings of the statements resem-
bles the inquiry required by the common law defamation defense of "fair comment." See,
e.g., Note, Defamation-Actionable Statement of Fact Versus Privileged Opinion: Oilman
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The most troubling aspect of the dissenting opinion is the cir-
cumstances under which it would impose liability for defamation.
Under the dissent's reasoning, a plaintiff would not have to prove
that the underlying facts upon which the defamatory inference is
drawn are false; rather, a plaintiff would have to prove that the
inference itself is false." 6 A plaintiff would not have a cause of ac-
tion merely by demonstrating the falsity of the statement. An ac-
tion for defamation would lie by demonstrating the falsity of the
underlying assumption.
Justice Brennan believes that "documentary or eyewitness tes-
timony that the speaker did not believe his own professed opinion
would be required before a court would be permitted to decide
that there was sufficient evidence to find that the statement was
false and submit the question to a jury.11 7 This seems to change
the meaning of falsity from an untruth to an untrue inference for
the purpose of defamation law. It requires malice or intent by the
author to draw a false inference before an action for defamation
could stand. This departs from the Court's prior pronouncements
on defamation, as well as from the private-public plaintiff distinc-
tion affecting the burden of proof a plaintiff must carry. Implicitly
overruling Gertz by altering this private-public plaintiff distinc-
tion, this analysis increases the standard necessary for a finding of
fault.118
The majority does not advocate a rule as severe as the one
espoused by the dissent. Under the majority's rule, a private plain-
tiff may prove the factual assertion false and recover only his ac-
tual damages. In order for a jury to award presumed or punitive
damages, the second inquiry must be satisfied. The second inquiry
would remain the threshold for a public figure or official to state a
cause of action.
In contrast, the dissent's view eliminates the first inquiry in all
cases. Justice Brennan writes that "[tihe assertion Jones must
prove false is that the speaker had, in fact, drawn the inference
that Jones lied."119 Under this standard the only way to prove fal-
v. Evans, 34 KANSAS L. REV. 367, 368 (1985). At common law, opinions based on true facts
were not actionable as defamatory under the defense of fair comment. Id. at 369. The un-
derlying facts had to be true, id. at 370, and could not be motivated by hostility or ill will.
Id.
116. 110 S. Ct. at 2710 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 2713 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2710.
119. Id. at 2710 n.4.
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sity is to prove the intent to defame.12
Further, Justice Brennan does not make a distinction between
a public or private plaintiff. 1 ' It would seem that he would also
eliminate the majority's first inquiry with respect to private figure
defamation plaintiffs as well. This would require all plaintiffs to
show actual malice, under the New York Times Co. standard, over-
ruling the private-public distinction in Gertz.'22
If, as Justice Brennan suggested, a statement cannot be the
basis for a defamation action because it is merely someone's opin-
ion, then no statements will be susceptible to a defamation suit.
Any statement can be asserted with impunity by employing the
appropriate modifiers to suggest opinion is being offered. Defama-
tion was designed to protect against unsubstantiated statements
which cause injury to a person's reputation.
Statements of opinion may cause the reader to infer underly-
ing facts. If these facts are not researched or verified, these state-
ments only serve to damage the reputation of the subject and add
nothing to public debate. Reporters should exercise care to insure
that statements are grounded in more than mere opinion if they
are to avoid defamatory effects.
IV. CONCLUSION
Freedom of speech and a citizen's right to protect his or her
name and reputation must be carefully balanced. Because any
opinion is founded on fact, any opinion may be subject to defama-
tion suits. This would stifle public debate. To adopt the balance
suggested by the dissent would tip the scale in favor of the defend-
ant at a point already rejected by Gertz.
Milkovich halts the progression in defamation law towards a
complete derision of that action and affirms the Supreme Court's
position as stated in its previous cases in the area of defamation.
2 3
The first amendment is one of our most precious freedoms. The
interests it protects are vital and potent in our society. However,
no one interest should be fostered at the expense of another to the
120. See supra text accompanying note 117.
121. It may be that Justice Brennan assumed it settled that Milkovich was a public
figure. See Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 106 S. Ct. 322 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(denial of certiorari).
122. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. This is the conclusion reached by the concurrence in Milkovich v. News-Herald,
46 Ohio St. 3d 20, 24, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1325 (1989) (Ford, J., concurring), which stated that
the effect of the Scott decision, in conjunction with Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Pub. Co.,
32 Ohio St. 3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979 (1987), was to mute the cause of action of libel in Ohio.
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extent that the cause of action is destroyed. 124 Individuals do not
always have meaningful access to combat statements made in the
media. If we do not respect an individual's reputation, and uphold
the means to preserve it, we may also loose sight of the individual's
substance.
In one sense, this opinion stands for the proposition that con-
stitutional protections will not be extended to statements that are
not adequately researched. It is conceivable that the Supreme
Court would have taken a different view of the circumstances if
Diadiun had minimally researched what transpired at the hearing,
or attended it himself. His failure to do so, coupled with the
strength of the statement, "Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing
after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth[,] ''12 5 did
not allow an alternative interpretation.
Constitutional protections are available to protect the free ex-
pression of thoughts and ideas. They exist to foster exchange and
uninhibited speech. In Milkovich, the Court declines to expand
those protections to include thoughtless, injurious remarks.
Mario J. Trespalacios*
124. 110 S. Ct. at 2715 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272). It is
true that "[wihatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." Id.
However, the rights of individual citizens must not be forgotten, particularly when the citi-
zen has no access to the media or otherwise has no way to rebut the defamatory statements.
The Constitution must also protect this citizen.
125. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
* J.D., 1991, University of Miami School of Law.
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